In August 1957, the Soviets successfully launched the SS-6 Sapwood ICBM. With an estimated range of 6,000 miles, the SS-6 represented a quantum leap in the Soviet rocketry program. American leaders were concerned as the Soviets now potentially had the capability to circumvent the North American air defenses. This concern was increased on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. With the advent of Sputnik, the general public became aware of America's potential vulnerability and placed U.S. defense programs in the spotlight. 43

With this new threat on the horizon, work continued to improve the nation's ability to defend against a bomber attack. The first SAGE center became operational at McGuire AFB, New Jersey in June 1958. Air defenses reached a zenith in 1962. Although there were fewer combat and direction centers than originally planned, the air defense system conceived in the early 1950s was largely in place. By 1962 the SAGE system was completed. From the permanent and mobile radar construction programs, 142 primary radar stations and 96 gap-filler radar sites were operational in the United States and Canada providing data to the SAGE centers. Many of the primary radar stations hosted FD radars. The DEW Line across the northern continent was complete.

The SAGE combat and direction centers commanded a vast array of weapon systems. Forty-one interceptor squadrons numbering 800 aircraft, seven BOMARC missile squadrons, and scores of Amy Nike missile battalions stood ready. 44

In retrospect, it is easy to understand reasons for the decline of America's air defenses in the years following 1962. Technical advances threatened to make America's air defenses irrelevant. Speaking before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations in February 1966, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara stated:

... [T]he elaborate defenses which we erected against the Soviet's bomber threat during the 1960s no longer retain their original importance. Today, with no defense against the major threat, Soviet ICBM's, our anti-bomber defenses alone would contribute very little to our damage limiting objective and their residual effectiveness after a major ICBM attack is highly problematical. For this reason we have been engaging in the past five years in a major restructuring of our defenses. 45

The introduction of ICBMs gave defensive planners a challenge they could not overcome, even though the Army spent billions of dollars to field an Antiballistic Missile (ABM) system. Despite the Army program, Secretary McNamara felt that an attack could only be deterred through the assured destruction of any attacker. Consequently, billions of dollars were spent to upgrade strategic forces; SAC sunk 1,000 Minuteman silos into the western countryside and the Navy commissioned forty-one ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets countered with their own deployment of extensive rocket forces and missile-equipped submarines. Warning networks were upgraded only to allow strategic forces additional time to launch a retaliatory blow should the Soviets launch an attack. For the time being, the proponents of offense as the best defense had won their case. 46

The new missile threat did not remove the bomber threat. However, many in Congress felt that funds spent on bomber defenses were wasted. During 1959, funds for additional FD and gap-filler radars were cut. Cuts were also made to the SAGE command and control program. 47

The funding prospects for air defense planners continued to look gloomy in 1960 as the Air Force advised NORAD that funding cuts expected in FY 1961 would force a revision of plans. Subsequently, NORAD identified twenty-six stations that could be released from the radar network. Some of the sites could be transferred to the FAA. The Air Force approved the plan and the deletions were made. 48

Meanwhile, funding cuts and technical difficulties plagued the frequency-diversity radar program. Testing of the AN/FPS-24, AN/FPS-27, and AN/FPS-35 revealed serious design deficiencies. Technicians worried that the FD radars might not be compatible with the new SAGE system. Concerns were expressed that the high-power output would interfere with other electronic systems. These concerns were confirmed when passing radar beams of anAN/FPS-35 being tested at Montauk, Long Island, interfered with radio receivers and scrambled television signals over a six-mile radius. At Almaden, California, testing of an AN/FPS-24 radar could only be conducted at times when the local television stations were not broadcasting. As more FD radars began testing, complaints from television and radio station owners, as well as viewers and listeners, began to mount in Congress. To review the problem, the Air Force called for a two-day conference at Hanscom Field, Massachusetts, at the beginning of August 1962. After reviewing the problem, electronics experts concluded that the interference problems could be resolved if broadcasters followed a few simple procedures. Consequently, the path was opened for round-the-clock FD radar operations. 49

While the ADC struggled to field FD radars, improvements to the existing network ofAN/FPS-20 radars made it less susceptible to jamming. With the installation of Bendix-produced AN/GPA-102 or AN/GPA-103 kits, the performance of the radars improved to such a degree that they warranted redesignation. By the end of 1962, over one-third of the 131 primary radars within the air defense network were FD types or were electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM)-modified AN/FPS-20s. Fifty radars were AN/FPS-7 sets that also had an ECCM capability. 50

With few exceptions, by the end of 1962 air defense network radars provided data feeds into the completed SAGE command and control network. A national network, SAGE included eight regional combat centers and twenty-two direction centers scattered around the nation. SAGE designers built redundancy into the system, which gave each combat center the capability to coordinate defense for the whole nation. Meanwhile, direction centers evaluated data feeds from sector radar sites and directed aircraft and missiles against the threat. The final SAGE direction center became operational at Sioux City, Iowa, in December 1961. SAGE centers allowed for a dramatic reduction of man-power over individual radar stations that once handled GCI functions. Manning levels dropped from nearly 200 to just over 100 men. Units designated as Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons were renamed as Radar Squadrons (SAGE).

SAGE was a powerful, albeit expensive system. It was also extraordinarily vulnerable. The combat and direction centers were housed in huge concrete blockhouses, hardened to withstand overpressures of only five pounds per square inch. The advent of Sputnik affected the planning and deployment of the command and control system. Air Force planners realized that Soviet ICBMs could destroy all or part of the SAGE system long before the first of their bombers crossed the Arctic Circle.

Fortunately, the technological achievement of the Soviet SS-6 Sapwood ICBM and Sputnik was matched by an American technological breakthrough of perhaps much greater significance. In the spring of 1958, IBM announced the development of a solid-state computer. Substituting transistors for vacuum tubes, air defense computers could be reduced in size and placed underground in hardened, reinforced concrete facilities. However, ADC plans to construct hardened facilities for SAGE centers were never fulfilled; spending priorities were shifted to develop and deploy American ICBMs. 52

In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy indicated in his budget message support for a manual back-up system to augment SAGE centers. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee in April 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara envisioned adding manual, ground-control intercept capability to augment SAGE centers at radar stations located away from probable target areas. 53

By the summer of 1961, NORAD was developing plans for what would become known as the Backup Interceptor Control (BUIC) system. Originally, the plan provided for an automated command and control capability for seventy radar stations. Eventually, the list was reduced to thirty in the United States and four in Canada. Some of these sites were planned as master control centers while others were planned as associate centers. Master control centers would assume immediate control of a sector should the regional SAGE direction center be knocked out. Associate centers provided additional redundancy. Site selection criteria focused on vulnerability. A station had to be located at least fifteen miles from an anticipated target. ADC favored locations with good radar coverage along with proximity to interceptor bases. To pay for the program, funds were transferred from the SAGE and FD radar programs.

BUIC implementation was envisioned as a two-phase plan. BUIC I consisted of the manual backup system originally proposed by McNamara. Twenty-seven radar sites were selected as master or NORAD control centers. Twenty-eight radars acted as associate centers with Ground Control Interception capability. Placing the system in operation simply meant restoring billets that were lost when GCI functions were assumed by the SAGE system. BUIC I reached initial operating capability in December 1962. 54

At the mine time BUIC I was becoming operational, contractors were submitting bids to provide the 'brains" for the follow-on automated BUIC II system. BUIC II radar sites would be capable of incorporating data feeds from other radar sectors directly onto their radar screens. In mid-1962, Burroughs Corporation won the contract to provide a military version of its D825 computer to be called the Radar Course Directing Group, AN/GSA-51. 55

Another back-up command and control program also had its roots during this time, The Airborne Surveillance and Control System (ASACS) was conceived by ADC planners to perform the role of a flying BUIC. Two phases of aircraft were planned with the more sophisticated version to become available in 1970. 56

Meanwhile, the SAGE system and the primary radar system faced further budget cuts. On December 3, 1962, McNamara recommended closing six SAGE direction command and control centers and seventeen radar stations by mid-1964; President Kennedy approved the measure.

The projected closure of SAGE direction centers sent air defense planners scrambling to prioritize the placement of the thirty-four proposed BUIC II sites. On June 4,1963, the Air Form approved installation of BUIC II at the first seven sites on the priority list. 57

During the BUIC II site selection process, at Secretary McNamara's direction, the Air Force undertook a detailed study to examine air defense requirements through 1975. In response, a Continental Air Defense Study (CADS) was completed in May 1963 that called for the replacement of SAGE centers by an improved BUIC and an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) sometime between 1966 and 1975. The improved BUIC sites (BUIC III) foresaw an upgraded AN/GSA-51 capable of integrating surveillance data from ten radar and providing an expanded control capability. The CADS recommended forty-six stations be given this capability. The DoD placed the recommendations on hold to await evaluations on the capabilities of airborne radar operating over land. Eventually, DoD determined that AWACS would not be ready for deployment until after1970. 58 Work proceeded on the installation of BUIC II and development of BUIC III. In1966, after the installation of a Burroughs CSA-51 computer system, North Trum Air Force Station (AFS) on Cape Cod became the first ADC installation configured as a BUIC II site. In 1968, North Truro also became the first radar station to be designated a BUIC III installation. 59

In addition to establishing BUIC sites, extraordinary steps were taken to protect the defense system's control center. Because of the vulnerability of Ent AFB to nuclear attack, planning had begun in 1956 for a mom secure command post elsewhere. Former NORAD Commanding General Earle E. Partridge once observed that the two-story

NORAD command building at Ent could be immobilized by a well-aimed bazooka shot, much less by a nuclear blast. To address the problem, architects designed a secure center to be set within man-made caverns in Cheyenne Mountain south of Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Corps of Engineers Omaha District oversaw the massive effort to dig out the caverns. On May 2, 1961, Utah Construction won the bid for the excavation work of the granite mountain. Workers blasted and removed one million tons of granite from inside the mountain. In February 1963, another bid opening placed interior construction work in the hands of Continental Consolidated Corporation. Eleven underground steel buildings were constructed to provide 170,000 square feet of space. To absorb shock waves, each building was mounted on giant steel springs. By February 1966, the "rock" was completed and NORAD began to shift operations from Ent AFB. 60

In 1966, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown proposed a plan that he hoped would overcome McNamara's aversion to air defense. Brown identified survivability, low-altitude detection, responsiveness, and costs as major flaws in the air defense system. In addressing these problems, Brown saw emerging technologies as the key to a more cost-effective and efficient air defense system. Brown's plan also called for phasing out most military radars around the nation's periphery. Detection duties would be assumed by FAA radars that would feed information into military control centers. To detect low-flying aircraft, Over-The-Horizon-Backscatter (OTH-B) radars were recommended. OTH-B stations would aim powerful radio beams and bounce them off the ionosphere back down on to the earth's surface. In theory, these radars would detect aircraft flying at any altitude at ranges out to 2,000 miles.

Brown's plan also pushed for procurement of the AWACS system for survivable command and control capability. Finally, Brown proposed development of the F-12 interceptor to replace aging fighter aircraft in the inventory. 61

Secretary McNamara approved Brown's plan. He was quick to initiate those portions that cut expenses. Radar stations were closed, and of those that remained, only twenty-two received the BUIC II automated, interception-control capability. By 1968, only radar stations around the nation's perimeter remained in Air Force jurisdiction. All gap-filler radars ceased operations. Interior stations were either closed or turned over to the FAA. However, with the Vietnam War absorbing more defense dollars, McNamara held off on the expenditure portions of Brown's plan. The AWACS and OTH-B program funding was stretched out over several years to support research and development. The F-12 interceptor program eventually was canceled . 62

In 1968, ADC became Aerospace Defense Command. However, Aerospace Defense Command fared no better under President Richard M. Nixon's new administration than the ADC had under President Lyndon B. Johnson's. Budget cuts closed down additional radar sites located along the southern perimeter of the country, such as Thomasville, Alabama, and Mount Lemmon, Arizona. By the start of 1970, the number of SAGE centers in the continental United States had been reduced to six: McChord AFB, Washington; Luke AFB, Arizona; Malmstrom. AFB, Montana; Duluth International Airport, Minnesota; Hancock Field near Syracuse, New York; and Fort Lee AFS in Virginia. These six remaining SAGE sites still used the vacuum tube Whirlwind II computers." 63

The ABM Treaty, signed in Moscow in 1972, limited the number of U.S. and Soviet ABM sites to one per country. The treaty signified the ultimate triumph of the offense over defense advocates as national leaders acknowledged that missile defenses were futile. Having adopted the attitude that no defense was possible against missile attacks, national defense strategists determined that continued bomber defenses were also a waste of expenditures. With no new aircraft, interceptor squadrons became antiquated. Many squadrons were disestablished or turned over to the Air National Guard. In 1974, Nike and BOMARC missile defense bases were closed. With the exception of a BUIC III at Tyndall AFB, ADCs BUIC III capability was mothballed. AWACS development continued to be limited to the research and development phase. Once these aircraft finally entered production in the mid-1970s, they were assigned to TAC. OTH-B continued as are search and development project. 64

In one region of the country during this period, air defenses received a boost. On October 26, 1971, a Cuban aircraft landed in New Orleans after flying completely undetected through American airspace. Publicity and political pressure from Louisiana Congressman R Edward Hebert forced the Air Force to redeploy aircraft and radars. Subsequently, the Air Force established the Southeast Air Defense Sector and reopened a radar network along the Gulf coast. 65

In 1975, reflecting a structural change in organization, ADC's acronym was changed to ADCOM, the Aerospace Defense Command. ADCOM's mission statement called for peacetime protection of air sovereignty and early warning against bomber attack. The command could only provide defense against a limited bomber attack if augmented by units of other commands and services. Because of funding reduction pressures from Congress, in 1977 planners began considering breaking up ADCOM. In 1979, components of ADCOM were turned over to other commands. On October 1, 1979, electronic assets went to the Air Force Communication Service and remaining radar, direction centers, and interceptor forces were transferred to TAC, which became AD-TAC. On December 1, 1979, SAC assumed control of ballistic missile warning and space surveillance facilities. ADCOM was officially disestablished as a major command on March 31, 1980. 66

The Soviet ICBM threat dramatically changed U.S. priorities to building detection and defensive capabilities against ballistic missile attack. Although Sputnik shocked the national psyche, the potential threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles had long been anticipated. Since the German V-2 campaign against England towards the end of World War II, military planners had been working with scientists and engineers to develop an antiballistic missile strategy.

Before the advent of the SS-6 Sapwood and Sputnik, both the Army and the Air Force had been conducting research and development programs leading to an antiballistic missile. The Air Force program, called "Project Wizard," was conceptual in nature. Project Wizard spent millions of dollars in various research labs to develop new technologies to counter the enemy threat. In contrast, the Army program, called "Nike Zeus," was more hardware oriented, building on technology of the earlier Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules antiaircraft missile programs.

In 1958, in the wake of Sputnik, President Eisenhower directed the cancellation of Project Wizard in favor of the Army Nike Zeus program. However, to defend against an attack, the United States needed the capability to detect an attack. Americans feared a nuclear Pearl Harbor, where without warning, nuclear bombs could drop from space, devastating American cities and crippling the military's ability to launch a counterattack. Without the means to defend against such an attack, Americans could only hope that the threat of massive retaliation would deter the Soviet Union from launching such a strike. Early warning would be critical to prepare the nation for the initial blow and allow SAC bombers to get off the ground.

Congress quickly approved funding to construct a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Radio Corporation of America (RCA) would develop and build theAN/FPS-49 tracking radars, GE and MIT would design and construct the AN/FPS-50 detection radars, and Western Electric would build the communication systems to connect the radars with command centers. Construction began immediately in the summer of 1958.

BMEWS required building installations at three locations to cover possible flight paths of missiles launched from the Soviet Union. Site I at Thule, Greenland, would host both AN/FPS-49 and AN/FPS-50 radars and receive top construction priority. Providing coverage for most missile approaches from the Eurasian landmass, the Thule site reached initial operating capability in October 1960. Clear, Alaska was selected for Site 11to provide warning against missiles launched from the far eastern Siberia region. Initially hosting only AN/FPS-50 detection radars, the Alaskan site began operating in late1961. Site III, at Fylingdale Moor, Yorkshire, England, was operational in September1963. At Fylingdale Moor, AN/FPS-49 tracking radars provided coverage of ICBMs launched at the United States from the far western Soviet Union and provided an alert for Europeans if the Soviets launched intermediate range missiles at targets in western Europe. 67

Construction at the ICBM detection station at Clear began in August 1958. Located eighty miles southwest of Fairbanks, the station consisted of dormitories, administrative buildings, storage warehouses, recreational facilities, radar buildings, transmitter and computer buildings, fuel facilities, and three huge fence antenna components of theAN/FPS-50.

Designed by GE and MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, the three fixed-in-place fence antennas stood 165 feet tall and 400 feet wide. These curved arrays sent two fan-shaped beams at differing angles beyond the earth's atmosphere. When an object passed through the lower-angled beam, the reflected radar pulses were picked up by supersensitive antennas and passed on to computers that determined the object's position and velocity. When objects passed through the higher -angled second beam, computers received additional information to determine trajectory, speed, impact point, impact time, and launch point. In 1966 a tracking radar was added to the site when Clear received an updated version of the AN/FPS-49. Designated as the AN/FPS-92, this tracking radar featured a movable antenna that locked onto objects identified by the detection radar. This provided additional data to NORAD headquarters. 68

NORAD received additional contributing sensors. In July 1973, Raytheon won a contract to build a system called "Cobra Dane" on Shemya Island in the Aleutian Islands off the Alaskan coast. Designated as the AN/FPS-108, Cobra Dane replaced AN/FPS- 17 andAN/FPS-80 radars placed at Shemya in the 1960s to track Soviet missile tests and to support the Air Force Space track System. Becoming operational in 1977, Cobra Dane also had a primary mission of monitoring Soviet tests of missiles launched from southwest Russia aimed at the Siberian Kamchatka peninsula. This large, single-faced, phased-array radar was the most powerful ever built. 69

In 1976, the Air Force began operating the Perimeter Acquisition Radar attack Characterization System (PARCS). The story of how the Air Force came to possess this huge, phased-array radar traces its roots back to the 1950s.

In February 1955, the Army contracted Bell Telephone Laboratories to develop an ABM system. This system would be built on the technologies obtained during Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules system development. However, the Nike Zeus system developed by Bell never deployed. Acting on advice that immediate deployment was not technically feasible at an acceptable cost, President Eisenhower decided in May 1959 to maintain Nike Zeus as a research and development program.

By January 1963, the research and development program had evolved into "Nike X" On September 18, 1967, Defense Secretary McNamara acknowledged that ABM defenses could still be overwhelmed by a massive Soviet ICBM attack. However, the emergence of a Chinese nuclear threat could be countered by deploying the Nike X system, renamed the Sentinel, around major metropolitan areas.

On March 14, 1969, the Nixon administration canceled the Sentinel deployment scheme. Instead ABM defense was deployed under the name "Safeguard" to protect America's strategic missile forces. Minuteman missile silos surrounding Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, and Malmstrom AFB, Montana, would be the first to receive ABM defense. 70

As a result of the 1972 ABM agreement, the United States completed work only at the site north of Grand Forks. Declared operational in 1975, the Grand Forks ABM site, armed with 100 defending missiles, could provide only a limited defense against the hundreds of warheads that the Soviets could employ. Furthermore, nuclear war scenarios foresaw the radar complexes coming under immediate attack, rendering the intercepting missiles useless. Faced with this futile situation, the Army wanted to operate the system for at least a year and then incorporate the lessons learned for a follow-on system. However, Army plans were cut short on October 2, 1975, when Congress voted to deactivate the site within the following year. Eventually the Air Force assumed operations of Safeguard's Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and redesignated the site as Cavalier Air Force Station. From its North Dakota location, PARCS provided additional polar coverage to support BMEWS. 71

BMEWS, along with additional sensors, gave NORAD the capability to warn the National Command Authority of an attack launched from the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union could attempt to circumvent the warning system using different geographical approaches. The Cuban Missile Crisis of the fall of 1962 was one such attempt. The placement of intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba illustrated the vulnerability of the United States to an attack along its unprotected southern border. Only after a highs takes showdown between the two superpowers, were the missiles removed.

In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, an AN/FPS-85 long-range phased-array radar was constructed at Eglin AFB in Florida. Designed by Bendix Corporation, the radar consisted of a large square transmitter array placed alongside an octangular receiving array mounted on a large structure facing the Gulf of Mexico. The structure hosting the radar burned in 1965, but was rebuilt and placed back in operation in 1969. This radar also served as the main sensor for the Air Force's Spacetrack System and watched the skies over Cuba and the Gulf. 72

The American triumph of keeping Soviet nuclear launch platforms out of Cuba and at a distance would be short-lived and American defense planners knew it. During the early 1960s, Soviet scientists and engineers worked feverishly to design and build Soviet ballistic missile submarines capable of launching missiles from relatively short distances off America's coastlines. Once again the United States needed the capability to detect incoming missiles to prevent the specter of an atomic sneak attack. In December 1961, the Air Force asked ADC for an evaluation of the capability of FD radars to detect Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Subsequently, AN/FPS-35 search radars located at Manassas, Virginia, and Benton, Pennsylvania, received modifications and began to be tested during the summer of 1962. During these tests, both radars attempted to track Polaris, Minuteman, Titan, and the Thor-Delta missile launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida. The tests revealed that the AN/FPS-35 had only marginal ability to detect missile launches. 73 However, using AN/FPS-35 or AN/FPS-24 FD radars to detect SLBMs continued to be considered a viable option given the fiscal constraints imposed on ADC.

Another option to detect SLBMs that was favored by ADC was to procure a series of An/FPS-49 radars. One of these units had been operating since 1961 at Moorestown, New Jersey, as the original sensor for the Air Force's Spacetrack System. To ADC's disappointment, a study by the Electronic Systems Division at Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, revealed that using the Moorestown radar for dual use was infeasible. 74

The long-tem vision of ADC planners foresaw SLBM detection as a collateral mission of the OTB-B radar that was still under development. However, ADC could not wait for a system that still was in the research and development stage. In November 1964, desperate to field at least an interim system to warn the nation of a SLBM attack, ADC sought and received permission from the office of the Secretary of Defense to modify existing SAGE system radars. 75

In the ensuing months, makers of the various SAGE-compatible radar systems submitted proposals on the modifications that would enable their products to detect an object of at least two meters in size, at a range of 750 miles, within six seconds after launching. The radar then would continuously track this object within ten seconds of detection and notify NORAD Combat Operations Center within sixty seconds.

In July 1965, the Air Force selected Avco Corporation for an innovative proposal employing its AN/FPS-26 height-finder radar to detect SLBMs. The modified AN/FPS-26 radar system (redesignated as the AN/FSS-7) was slated for deployment at Point Arena. California; Mount Laguna California; Mount Hebo, Oregon; Charlestown, Maine; Fort Fisher, North Carolina; MacDill AFB, Florida; and Laredo Texas. 76

After years of testing and evaluation, the seven-site SLBM detection system became fully operational in 1971. A year later, twenty percent of the surveillance capability of the AN/FPS-85 located at Eglin AFB, Florida, also became dedicated to search for SLBMs. 77

During the 1970s, the Soviets developed SLBMs that could be launched from greater distances away from the American Coastline. For example, the Soviet Delta I class ballistic missile submarine carried the SS-N-8 missile that had a range of over 4,000 nautical miles. This was beyond the detection capability of either the AN/FSS-7 or the OTH-B radar system being developed. 78 Consequently, the Air Force had to turn to another solution.

The solution was a phased-array warning system to become known as "PAVE PAWS" (Perimeter Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System). Originally designed as a two-site system, PAVE PAWS sites were constructed in the late 1970s at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, and Beale AFB, California. From a distance, the PAVE PAWS structure looked like a three-sided pyramid with a flattened top. On the two seaward faces of the pyramid, Raytheon installed the AN/FPS-115 with its phased-array antenna. Thirty meters in diameter and consisting of 2,000 elements, each antenna could detect objects launched as far away as 3,000 miles. The Otis site became operational in 1979and the Beale site became operational a year later.

A contract for two more continental PAVE PAWS sites, was awarded in 1984. AnANfFPS-115 at Robins AFB, Georgia, became operational in 1986 and another unit at Eldorado AFS, Texas, was activated in 1987. Additional AN/FPS-115 PAVE, PAWS radars were installed in the 1990s at BMEWS sites at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdale Moor, England, to assume the ICBM detection mission. As PAVE PAWS sites in the United States were activated, the older AN/FSS-7 radars were phased out, except for the MacDill AFB site that continued to provide additional coverage over Cuba . 70

Spacetracking and missile detection functions of the former Aerospace Defense Command were assumed by SAC in 1980. Control of these facilities became an Air Force Space Command responsibility with the activation of that command on September 1, 1982.